The GATEMAN project is a research project focused on proving a novel concept for integrated GNSS interferences air navigation threats management, aiming at, on the one hand, their detection and localization and, on the other, their mitigation, either to keep GNSS navigation operative or, if that is not possible, to revert to a cost effective alternative technology (5G) that is able to support GNSS-based approaches.
The management of these GNSS threats (namely jamming and spoofing) would be based on existing aircraft antennas (i.e. no need of beamforming nor directional antennas) with upgrades at software level. These algorithms, implementing detection and localization, will be validated in open-field tests, using a scale-down on-ground representative scenario.
In addition this concept includes an optional operational mode in which a ground facility would be involved, integrating the information received from the aircrafts and raising alerts when interfering events are confirmed.
On the other hand, GATEMAN project evaluates mitigation techniques at signal-processing level (spoofing monitoring) to enhance the robustness of GNSS positioning against spoofing attacks. Besides GATEMAN evaluates alternatives positioning technologies (A-PNT) based on 5G to obtain navigation during GNSS jamming events.

GATEMAN’s Objectives

GATEMAN is an Air Traffic Management (ATM) application‐oriented research project that aims at helping to mature new concepts beyond those identified in the SESAR ATM Master Plan as well emerging technologies and methods to the level of maturity required to feed the applied research conducted in the Industrial Research and Validation phase of SESAR.

The main goal of this research project is to prove a novel concept for integrated GNSS RFI (both jamming and spoofing) air navigation threats management, aiming at, on the one hand, their detection and localisation and, on the other, their mitigation. This innovative threats management approach will allow, either to keep GNSS navigation operative or, if that is not possible, to revert to an alternative PNT technology that is able to support GNSS-based approaches (at least NPA procedures), and that is cost effective because it minimises the need for the deployment of additional ground infrastructure to be funded by ANPS or other aviation stakeholders.
The novelty of GATEMAN is that the management of those GNSS threats would be based on existing aircraft equipment (with minor modifications), with an optional operational mode in which a ground facility would be involved. These features of our concept will therefore address the combination of existing on-board and ground equipment to unlock unforeseen possibilities for the ANSPs (GNSS threats management).
Keeping in mind the time frame of the SESAR Exploratory Research program, we will take a GPS L1/L5 plus Galileo E1/E5a scenario as the reference for our research project: i.e. we will address the detection, localisation and mitigation of jamming and spoofing attacks on those constellations/bands.
For the A-PNT technology we will research the potential application of the new 5G generation of ground cell stations networks, at least so support the approach phase of the flight.
This technology has two distinctive advantages over other technologies under research to support an Alternate Positioning, Navigation and Timing (A-PNT) system such as eLORAN or L-DACS-N : first of all, an economic advantage, because the latter would require the deployment of a network of stations likely to be funded, at least partially, by aviation stakeholders (or a government body) and, secondly, an operational advantage, because, assuming that the 5G networks will be as dense as the current 3G/4G networks, it may overcome any orography constrain around an airport that otherwise would preclude the availability of a navigation service provided for the approach phase by the closest eLORAN or L-DACS-N en-route stations.
The specific goals of GATEMAN will be to research the technical feasibility of reaching certain performances in several GNSS threats management functional areas, up to the corresponding TRL as follows:

  • Jamming detection and localisation (TRL3)
  • Spoofing detection and localisation (TRL3)
  • Mitigation: spoofing monitoring (TRL2)
  • Mitigation (A-PNT): navigation based on 5G (TRL1)

To assess that technical feasibility, different methods will be used: (a) theoretical analysis, (b) software simulation, (c) hardware-in-the-loop simulation, and/or (d) field experiments of a demonstrator.
The methods that will be applied to each of the GNSS threats management research areas indicated above will be commensurate with the likelihood of the GNSS threat concerned and with the maturity of the underlying technology to be applied. Moreover, the effort to be devoted to each of those research areas, as well as the target Technology Readiness Level (TRL) to be achieved in each case, will be also proportionate to the same criteria.

A second goal of GATEMAN is to consolidate the concept of RFI GNSS Threat Management, in particular in terms of a sound concept of operations and a high level architecture of the airborne system and ground facility required to implement that operational concept.
The consolidation of the concept of operations will address, among other issues, the expected coverage, availability and accuracy of the airborne-based GNSS detection and localization service in the different phases of flight (e.g. en-route and TMA/approach), and an estimation of the air/ground link data bandwidth required to implement the cooperative mode of operation of that service.